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Comparative Law as Basic
Research
By JEROME HALL*
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, Indiana University;
J.D., University of Chicago, 1923; S.J.D., Harvard, 1935; Jur. Sc.D.,
Columbia, 1935; LL.D., University of North Dakota, 1958; LL.D.,
Thbingen, 1978.
This paper discusses three subjects. First, and most impor-
tant, it addresses the need to discover and delineate the structure
of a scientific theory of penal law. Secondly, I submit that com-
paratists and other scholars should concentrate on the action of
legislators, judges and ministerial officers with reference to penal
violations, conformity and obedience. I call this subject "law-as-
action." Thirdly, there is the need to address the problem of types
of knowledge and where among them the comparative law disci-
pline should be placed.
Many legal scholars accept as law all rules backed by sanctions
and issued by the political sovereign. But "basic research," "princi-
ples," and "method"1 have epistemological connotations. Our first
topic, therefore, calls for philosophical inquiry enlightened by legal
knowledge, especially of penal law, or rather legal scholarship sen-
sitive to the significance of philosophical analysis. In this view it
cannot be assumed that "penal law" has a definite universally ac-
cepted meaning. Since the elucidation of "penal law" presupposes
the definition of "positive law," the class within which penal law is
contained and within which it must be distinguished from non-
penal law, inquiry must first be focused on "positive law. ' '2
The concept of positive law that one subscribes to depends on
* This paper was presented at the International Colloquy held in Freiburg, W. Ger-
many, October 23-25, 1978, celebrating the dedication of a new building to house the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law. Stylistic changes have been
made, several footnotes have been added, and certain statements in the oral presentation
have been clarified or amplified.
1. These terms were used in the printed program to indicate the meaning of the
assigned topic.
2. J. HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SocIAL THEORY 49-59 (1963).
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one's philosophy of law;3 these philosophies now include existential
and phenomenological philosophies of law. For the present pur-
pose, however, where a determination of this question is limited
and guided by the characteristics of knowledge of comparative law,
the issue may be narrowed to a choice between legal positivism and
natural law-sociological theories. Specifically, we must find which
of these types of concepts of law more adequately satifies the needs
of comparative law research.
In dealing with this question it is helpful to look first to the
past, to the views of distinguished scholars regarding comparative
law. The salient fact is that even comparatists like Gutteridge and
his students, David and Hamson, who said that comparative law is
only a method, also held that it is important to study the function
of law and its social context.4 Opposed to the view that compara-
tive law is only a method was the position of other comparatists
who held as long ago as the 1900 Paris conference that comparative
law is the sociology of law.5 Their successors include such distin-
guished comparatists as Rabel, Rheinstein and others." What is
important here is to recognize that there was a very significant
area of agreement in the views of all the above comparatists. They
all recognized the importance of knowledge of function, social con-
text and sociology, as distinguished from the analytical knowledge
sought in legal positivism.
Without depreciating the achievement of positivism in analy-
sis, it is plain that legal positivism is quite inadequate for compar-
ative study, and it is no accident that leading legal positivists have
not been much interested in comparative law. The reason is that
legal positivism, based on the fact of state power, concentrates on
the political structure and the interrelations of all commands of
the sovereign 7 or on the implications of a Grundnorm.8 Legal posi-
3. Id. at 70.
4. H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1949); R. DAVID, TRAIT tLAMENTAIRE DE
DROIT CIVIL COMPARt (1950); C. HAMSoN, THE LAw: ITS STUDY AND COMPARISON (1955).
5. CONGPAS INTERNATIONAL DE DRorr COMPAR TENU A PARIS DU 31 JUILLET AU 4 AouT
1900, PROC9S-VERBAUX DES SkANCES L-r DocUMENTs (1905). For these scholars comparative
law is a type of knowledge, a social science. For further references see J. HALL, supra note 2,
at 10.
6. Rabel, Some Major Problems of Applied Comparative Law, Especially in the Conflict
of Law, (Aug. 1948), a report to the Institute in the Teaching of International and Compara-
tive Law; Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, (1938); and Rhein-
stein, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law, 1 Am. JOUR. CoMP. L. 95, 98 (1952) [hereafter
cited as Teaching Tools].
7. This position was held by John Austin, who defined the law in terms of the "coin-
[Vol. 4
Comparative Law as Basic Research
tivism ignores the content of enactments and decisions and claims
to be neutral regarding moral valuation. While for the legal posi-
tivist content is not relevant to the analysis of structure, the com-
parativist believes that a search for the content of enactments and
decisions is essential.9
Legal positivists discuss the logical validity of certain laws,
their efficacy and their effect on "happiness". This ad hoc sort of
knowledge is contributed by legal philosophers who deal with spe-
cific laws but not with the problems met in constructing a concept
of law in general. 10 Accordingly, when they speak of good laws and
bad laws, but not of law, they remain on the level of ordinary
speech. In taking that direction they fail to provide a concept of
law; when they do provide such a concept, the latter reflects their
positivist view of law. Thus, among legal positivists, Kelsen does
construct a concept of law, but he depreciates moral values and
facts; hence, his science of law is strictly formal. If one follows the
previously noted comparatists' references to function, social con-
text, and sociology to their final implication, their goal is not a for-
mal science but an empirical, qualitative type of knowledge.-,
One important view of this kind of knowledge assimilates soci-
ology of law to empirical science.12 Empirical science consists of
generalizations about common facts found in experience. The field
of data or, if one prefers, the experience of data, must be uniform
if the generalizations are to be valid. Thus, for example, the law of
falling bodies is limited to the uniform conditioris of a perfect vac-
uum; the chemical elements described in terms of their atomic
mand of the sovereign". For criticism of Austin's position see Manning, Austin Today, in
MODERN THEORIES OF LAw 180 (1933).
8. The most important 20th century work is H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945).
9. For an introduction to the modern origins of comparative law see J. HALL, supra
note 2, at 15-21.
10. "Most English writers have, in defining law, defined it in the concrete instead of in
the abstract sense. They have attempted to answer the question: What is a law? while the
true inquiry is: What is law?" J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 38 (7th ed. 1924). Beale criticized
the positivist school for ignoring the systematic aspect of the common law. J. BEALE, TREA-
TISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.4, at 47 (1935), reprinted in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE
410, 411. (J. Hall ed. 1938).
11. For example, Professor Max Rheinstein stated that comparative law "is the obser-
vational and exactitude-seeking science of law in general ... it searches for... laws in the
sense in which the word is used in the 'sciences,' laws of the kind of Newton's laws of gravi-
tation.., laws.., in that sense in which the word is understood in modern natural sci-
ence". Teaching Tools, supra note 6, at 98-99. See also R. DAVID, supra note 4, at 6.
12. J. HALL, supra note 2, at 23-26.
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weight are descriptions of the same kind of datum.
In all fields, and on one or another level, science is concerned
with uniformities. Where science erred in the past, the reason was
usually the undetected presence of an alien substance. If we apply
the requirement that the field of data must be uniform to the pre-
sent question, it becomes apparent that if morally valid enact-
ments or decisions are not distinguished from immoral, outrageous
ones, the essential condition of valid generalization is not satisfied,
indeed, it is rendered impossible. If we wish to advance compara-
tive knowledge, we must not only take account of the content of
enactments and decisions, but also divide and classify it into uni-
form types.
In appraising the following suggested concept of law,13 it is
necessary to keep in mind that what is needed is a descriptive defi-
nition that is adequate by reference to its correspondence with rel-
evant realities. A defensible concept of law must specifically
represent:
1. the moral validity of positive law;
2. the important functions of such law;
3. its regularity rather than its systematic character if primitive
law is to be included;
4. its protection of public interests;
5. its effectiveness;
6. its supremecy in the hierarchy of norms; and
7. its inexorability.
This last requirement implies inclusion of the sanction in the
concept of law and, for penal law, the distinctive character of its
sanction. 14 This does not warrant interpretation of punishment
apart from the criteria specified in the hypotheses of penal laws,
since the ethical meaning of "harm" and "act" is necessary to the
correct elucidation of the meaning of "punishment."
Thus we have derived the meaning of "penal law" by
determining first the essential characteristics of positive law, and
then distinguishing penal law from the non-penal members of the
class. We must now consider another essential prerequisite of com-
parative study, namely, mastery of one's own penal law, knowledge
of those other parts of one's legal system required for expert
13. For supporting discussion see J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE ch. 5 (1973).
14. The concept of 'sanction' as an integral part of positive law has been a much de-
bated subject. See J. HALL, supra note 2, 51-57.
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knowledge of that penal law and a scientific understanding of pe-
nal law.
Scientific Knowledge of Penal Law
If we examine a field of universally recognized scientific
knowledge, for example physics, we find that the organized charac-
ter of that science is particularly significant. 15 In other words, the
laws of physics are so logically interconnected as to form a system;
each law has therefore not only logical but also substantive signifi-
cance for other laws. Scientific thought or method has also found
expression in law, e.g., in the division of European penal codes into
a general and a special (specific) part. I believe that we can ad-
vance much farther in the use of scientific method, and organize
penal law much more systematically than has been achieved in the
dominant treatises.1"
If we borrow from scientific knowledge and seek a similar goal,
we can distinguish three levels of generalization that comprise
the substantive criminal law. These are: "rules," "doctrines," and
"principles". These terms represent progressively wider concepts.
"Rules" state what is distinctive in each crime. For example, they
state the material elements of larceny or robbery, including the
particular mens rea of each crime without reference to justification
or excuse. These normal definitions are qualified by more general
propositions usually called "defences," such as those concerning in-
fancy, insanity, ignorance or mistake, coercion, self-defense, and
necessity, propositions that I call "doctrines". In addition to the
above doctrines of excuse and justification, there are "relational"
doctrines concerning complicity, solicitation, conspiracy, and at-
tempt. When all the doctrines are applied to all the rules, a mini-
mal statement of the criminal law of any country is expressed.
But in advanced legal systems there is an additional and most
important feature that must be incorporated into a science of crim-
inal law. One can derive the ultimate categories which permeate
the combined set of propositions from the union of all the rules
and all the doctrines. These are the seven principles of criminal
law, namely, legality, mens rea, effort (or "act"), the fusion of
mens rea with effort (or act) to comprise conduct, harm, the causal
15. "Science searches for relations. . . its coherent systems." Einstein, in READINGS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 779 (H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck, eds. 1953).
16. H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS (1978); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd. ed. 1961).
No. 1]
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relation between conduct and harm, and the punitive nature of the
sanction. In sum, there are three kinds of propositions which com-
prise the substantive criminal law. From their interrelations we see
that the rules are limited by the doctrines and the principles are
implicit in that union of rules and doctrines.
These interrelations deserve closer inspection. For example,
the principle of mens rea is derived from all the relevant doctrines,
such as insanity and mistake, and also from the significance of the
"normal" mentes reae described in the rules. The defendant fre-
quently does not plead an excuse or justification; he simply denies
the charge in the indictment. If he is found guilty, his mens rea is
the "normal" one expressed in the rules minus the doctrines, that
is, he was a sane adult, knew the facts, was not acting in self-de-
fense and so on and, therefore, was neither justified nor excused.
Thus, "mens rea" is given definite meaning by its necessary inclu-
sion as "normal" in the rules and by its further explication by ref-
erence to the doctrines. Finally, if we ask why was the defendant
justified or not justified or excused, we can state the answer in
terms of the ultimate principles of the criminal law without imply-
ing that justification and excuse are wholly absorbed in those
principles.
Although the principles are "ultimate" in the above indicated
sense, they must be distinguished from the simple unity which
characterizes concepts found in other sciences, such as physics. For
example, mens rea is a fusion of cognition and volition, and the
fact that mens rea adds meaning to the other principles implies
that they, too, are not simple concepts. Thus, the principle of cau-
sation, linking conduct to harm, is qualified by the meaning of
mens rea. If mens rea is limited to mental states which express
voluntary conduct, such as intentionality and recklessness, that
limitation restricts the meaning of causation as distinguished from
scientific causation defined as the covariation of variables. Mens
rea also qualifies "harm"; it is not simply a death or loss of posses-
sion that is a harm in penal law, but a death or loss of possession
caused voluntarily by a sane, sober adult, in sum, without justifica-
tion or excuse. Harm must be related to mens rea to define the
latter concept. Thus, it is intentionally or recklessly committing a
proscribed harm, not mens rea in isolation, that determines the
meaning of "mens rea". Likewise, harm as a bridge between volun-
tary misconduct and punishment gives "punishment" a congruent
meaning. Finally, the principle of legality serves as the formal ve-
[Vol. 4
Comparative Law as Basic Research
hicle to place definite bounds on all concepts and propositions of
penal law. This brief discussion of a broad subject only indicates
the contextual significance of interrelated criminal law proposi-
tions and the desirability of organizing that corpus juris. All of the
above distinctions drawn among principles, doctrines, and rules
can be employed in analyzing all modern legal systems. Their or-
ganization provides the structure of a science of criminal law.
This organization of propositions also comprises an important
vantage point from which one can reach out to compare one's pe-
nal law with the penal law of other countries. It is hazardous to
assume that a verbal principle has the same operative meaning in
both legal systems; but if we remember that a principle is an in-
duction from rules and doctrines and that verbal formulas may not
be actualized, comparative knowledge can be realistic.
Criminal Law-As-Action
This thesis is a departure from traditional views of compara-
tive law. The traditional and still prevalent view is that the subject
of such study is certain propositions comprising the normative con-
cepts of penal law. To come directly to the conclusion I reached
elsewhere after an extended discussion,17 I submit that the subject
matter of comparative legal study should be law-as-action. Law-as-
action is the integration of legal rules and other ideas, of the facts
expressed in relevant manifested behavior and phenomena, and of
the value of being directed towards good goals. Since legal scholars
outside English-speaking countries may assume that this thesis is
an expression of American Legal Realism,"8 some crucial differ-
ences must be noted. First, I focus on action, not behavior. Second,
I attach great significance to rules of law. Third, I reject the real-
ists' separation of the Is and Ought of law. Accordingly, I find the
moral validity of law essential in a defensible concept of law."9
The first support of the concept of law-as-action is found in
the work of the legal comparatists previously mentioned, 20 espe-
cially in their emphasis on the function of legal rules. I have tried
17. J. HALL, supra note 13, ch. 6 (1973).
18. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 3-101 (1962).
19. The work of Dilthey and other post-Hegelians concerning the expression of ideas in
history as well as Max Weber's concentration on social action as the central concept of his
sociology of law (except Weber's theory of a wertfei social science) have had much influence
on my theory of law-as-action.
20. Note 6 supra.
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to build on their contribution in the following ways. Law-as-action
is more precise than the function of law. First, function, as de-
scribed by legal comparatists sometimes has a purely factual con-
notation that is not adequate regarding the expression of purpose
and valuation.21 Second, there are still unresolved problems as to
how ideas become actualized. These difficulties are avoided if we
start with actions in which those ideas are included. Unlike the
purer concepts of logic or mathematics, legal concepts refer to facts
and events; acccordingly legal rules are action concepts. In doctri-
nal analysis the scholar holds in mind his experience and his mem-
ory of the facts, actions, and events to which these concepts refer.
Law-as-action is the articulation and the further extension of what
necessarily but inadequately and sometimes misleadingly goes on
in doctrinal analysis. The acceptance of law-as-action as the sub-
ject matter of comparative study requires a distinction between
merely paper rules and operative rules. If we are interested in the
maximum knowledge of penal law, we must go far beyond the
boundaries of traditional doctrinal analysis.
The shift in focus from rules to actions is also supported, in-
deed it is required, by the shift in the type of problems com-
paratists are now expected to solve and by the corresponding
change in intellectual interests. While scholars are free to concen-
trate on doctrinal analysis, it is also true that the legal problems of
increasingly intermingled cultures and current scholarly interests
support wide-ranging inquiries that draw on history, moral philos-
ophy, and the social disciplines.
Since methods depend on the nature of the data studied and
reflect the kind of knowledge sought in comparative study, many
comparatists seem to have agreed that the objects of research are
"common concepts."22 But, if we are to rise above the level of for-
malistic verbalism, we must focus our research on the actions of
officials as the basic reference data from which we construct more
cogent common concepts. Comparative study limited to the terms
employed in penal codes finds common concepts among Japanese,
European, and American penal codes. But, the same formula may
21. For an introduction to and criticism of legal functionalism see J. HALL, supra note
2, at 104-608.
22. For an introduction to the debate surrounding the notion of "common concepts of
comparative law" see J. HALL, supra note 2, at 59-68. See also R. Schlesinger, The Common
Core of Legal Systems: An Emerging Subject of Comparative Study, XXTH CENTURY COM-
PARATIVE AND CONFLICTs LAWS 65 (K. Nadelmann, A. von Mehren, & J. Hazard eds. 1961).
[Vol. 4
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function differently in different cultures. For example, a modern
South Korean Code gives women the same right to divorce as that
given to men. A Western scholar might interpret this provision by
imaging facts that are familiar in his culture. However, in Korea no
woman has ever sued for divorce; the right given her is never actu-
alized.2" Again, in traditional Korean law, the eldest son inherited
all of his father's estate, but he was socially constrained to divide
the property among his brothers and sisters to their satisfaction.
The provision in the modern Korean code that directly distributes
the property among all the children has not supplanted the influ-
ence of the eldest son in determining what actually happens to the
estate.24 Traditional Japanese law made parricide the most serious
homicide. Despite the fact that this has been dropped from current
Japanese penal law it seems obvious that such a case would be
treated very differently in Japan and in Western countries, even in
France, whose Code includes a provision on "parricide. '25
There are many analogous situations within any given culture.
There are often cases where the code says one thing while practice
runs in a different direction. For example, in American states
where adultery was the only ground for divorce, thousands of di-
vorces were granted for quite different reasons on the filing of uni-
versally recognized fabrications of adultery. There are provisions in
some codes that the same punishment should be imposed for at-
tempt as for the consummated crimes but, in my study of that
question some years ago, I found that invariably very different
punishments were imposed.26
If comparative legal study is to go beyond the verbal proposi-
tions in codes, it must distinguish paper rules from rules that are
expressed in action. It must also distinguish between actions that
express the rules and actions that depart from those formulations
but are influenced by them. As stated, law-as-action may be char-
acterized as the integration of legal and other ideas, the conduct
manifested in the acts of legislators, judges, and ministerial officers
and, also, the expression of values in reaching towards sound goals.
23. Personal communication to the author.
24. Id.
25. Code Penal, art. 299.
26. French writers state that in actual administration, attempts are punished much less
severely than the ultimate crimes. P. GARRAUD, PRIeCIS DE DROIT CRIMINEL 220-21 (15th ed.
1934); Roux, TRAiTA EULMENTAIRE DE DROrT PIkNAL 114 (2nd ed. 1927); P. GARRAUD & M.
LABORDE-LAcOSTE, Pa -is EULMENTAIRE DE DRorr P1NAL 70 (12th ed. 1936). Cf. WES-
TERMARCK, ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 245-46 (1912).
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Furthermore, law-as-action is free in the sense that it is not co-
erced. Law-as-action is also purposive and its goals are fixed by the
social problems whose solutions are sought. Finally, it is helpful to
distinguish the direct results of law-as-action from its conse-
quences. For example, the result of penalizing the use of marijuana
may be the deterrence of many prospective smokers, but an un-
sought consequence may be an increase in its illegal manufacture
and sale.
A thorough study of law-as-action requires an analysis of the
various levels of cognition of the legal comparatists of various cul-
tures from the perspectives of relevant epistemologies. From the
perspective of classical realism, one may speak of the discovery of
the same universal in various instances of law-as-action. The class-
ical realist view of thinking is congenial among legal scholars be-
cause they inspect and analyze verbal symbols such as rules, doc-
trines, and principles. Those who rely on resemblance theories
reject what modernists call the "myth of universals".27 Phenome-
nonological theory finds cognition in action, in the perception of
signs, and in imaging; this may be regarded as an intensive study
of the principal concern of the sociologists of Verstehen.28
But whatever epistemology is espoused, there is general agree-
ment that the search must be for similarities among equally impor-
tant differences. It is obviously much easier to discover recurrent
similarities when we deal with such common physical qualities as
redness or hardness or circularity. By comparison, the "universal"
characteristics of human nature have been variously defined, ex-
tending from two or three common qualities to the ten characteris-
tics specified by Scheler.29 Law-as-action raises similar complexi-
ties. We are required to interpret the subject-matter of law-as-
action by reliance on the knowledge and insight acquired in a par-
ticular culture, which may be influenced by the study of other
cultures.
This thesis can be further elucidated by reference to the study
of the law of preliterate societies and the work of anthropologists
regarding the South Sea Islanders described by Malinowski30 and
27. H. H. PRICE, THINKING AND EXPERIENCE (2nd ed. 1953).
28. READINGS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION (N. Care & C. Landesman eds. 1968); Schutz,
Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action, 14 PHILOSOPHY AND PHE-
NOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 1 (1963). See also A. SCHUTZ, COLLECTED PAPERS (1964).
29. M. SCHELER, MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE 36 (H. Meyerhoff trans. 1961).
30. B. MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
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more recent research such as the cooperative work of Llewellyn
and Hoebel on the Cheyenne Indianss 1 Among the Cheyenne, for
example, if someone makes off with a horse, the owner complains
to the tribal leaders. This is followed by hearings before selected
members of the tribe and the final imposition of a privation, from
all of which a rule or rules can be inferred. The articulation of
rules and their expression in permanent media are later
developments.
Intermediate Character of Comparative Law
It is therefore a simplification, though a necessary addition, to
say that the distinctive facts of history, institutions, and cultures
negate any easy solution of this problem, and necessitate reliance
on description to supplement the generalizations that do not in-
clude significant facts. History is thus essential in comparative
study and thereby implies that intuition is a basic epistemological
method of such research. Like art, history concentrates on particu-
lar persons, events, actions, and causes. Although the historian is
influenced by various theories and generalizations, his purpose, un-
like that of the sociologist, is not to verify those generalizations,
but to concentrate on the particulars that are instances of them.
32
At the opposite extreme is the general knowledge of the physi-
cal scientist. The scientist omits all characteristics that do not
come within his generalizations and seeks laws, e.g., the expansion
of gas in relation to the rise in temperatuue or, inversely, in rela-
tion to increase in pressure. Nineteenth century legal comparatists,
influenced by biology, were interested in trend generalizations. For
example, Maine speculated that the evolution of the law of pro-
gressive societies has been from a law of status to contract law.33
Others formulated trends in terms of the stages of evolution, e.g.,
from primitive mechanical law to highly differentiated laws.3 4 In
the 20th century the model of physics strongly influences sociolo-
gists who seek generalizations that express the co-variation of
variables.
If we wish to describe the knowledge acquired by legal com-
31. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HoEBEL, THE CHIYENNE WAY (1941).
32. Hughes, The Historian and the Social Scientist, 66 AM. HIsT. REV. 27 (1966);
ToYNBEa AND HISTORY 115 (M. Ashley Montague ed. (1956)); Krieger, The Horizons of His-
tory, 63 AM. HisT. REv. 62, 67, 72 (1957).
33. H. MAINE, ANczaNT LAW 165 (F. Pollock ed. 1906).
34. E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocmYr (G. Simpson trans. 1933).
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paratists or even speculate on what is attainable in the foreseeable
future, we must locate it intermediately between the particular
knowledge of the historian and the wholly generalized knowledge
of the physical scientist. This analysis is compatible with recent
studies that have abandoned the search for a universal history, ev-
olutionary trends, or co-variations and, instead, are concerned with
the comparison of a branch of law of two or three legal systems or
with certain rules or principles of the penal law of two or three
countries. Thus, legal scholars concentrate on an intermediate type
of knowledge-taxonomic knowledge. This results from the com-
plexities that distinguish human actions from the relative simplic-
ity of the data of physics or chemistry. A sociology of criminal law,
if or when achieved, will need the support of both cultural legal
history and the taxonomic character of current comparative study.
While all three types of knowledge- particular, general, and
taxonomic-are important, there are many practical difficulties.
Differences in temperament and limitations of time and equipment
demonstrate the need for institutes where scholars can cooperate
by focusing on one or another of the types of research required for
full explanation. An institute could supplement traditional analysis
by including among its members scholars interested in cultural le-
gal history and in the sociology of penal law.
In view of the fact that an institute may be dedicated to the
study of criminology as well as of penal law, as the Max Planck
Institute, it is important to recognize that "criminology" is as am-
biguous a term as is "penal law." One need only refer to the work
of some 19th century Italian criminologists who excluded penal law
from their definition of "crime 3 5 to recognize the need for specifi-
cation. Without attempting an elucidation of "criminology" such
as that indicated above for "penal law," I suggest that a synthesis
of the above outlined theory of penal law with that of the desig-
nated subject matter called "law-as-action" would provide the nec-
essary determination that "criminology" be taken as synonymous
with "sociology of penal law." A consensus on this point would in-
hibit far-ranging criminological studies, such as those regarding the
causes of crime. Instead, the study of law-as-action guided by the
structure of penal law, discussed above in terms of the interrela-
tions of rules, doctrines, and principles, would coordinate the re-
search of an institute's criminologists and legal scholars.
35. E.g., R.GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY 4-5, 10, 33, 42, 51, 60 (R. Millar trans. 1914).
[Vol. 4
